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We search for behavioral rules that attain minimax regret under geometric discounting in the
context of repeated decision making in a stationary environment where payo¤s belong to a given
bounded interval. Rules that attain minimax regret exist and are optimal for Bayesian decision
making undertheprior wherelearning can beargued to bemost di¢cult. Minimax regret can be
attained by randomizing using a linear function of theprevious payo¤s. For myopic individuals,
minimax regret behavior requires only one round of memory, for intermediate discount factors
two rounds of memory su¢ce to attain minimax regret.
JEL classi…cation: D81, D83.1 Introduction
Decision making is an elementary part of human behavior. It is the foundation of any model of
strategicinteraction. Thetheory of decision making thus in‡uences directly or indirectly almost
any economic prediction. Under what we call rational decision making today (von Neumann-
Morgenstern1944, Savage1972), thedecisionmaker …rst speci…esa priorprobability distribution
over the set of states that may occur. Then he selects the action that maximizes expected
utility and updates this initial prior after any new information arrives. We call a decision maker
Bayesian if he behaves according to this procedure. From the start the Bayesian approach has
been criticized. In particular it has been questioned whether individuals are able to form such
priors and whether they have the ability and time to perform the necessary calculations. These
objections are particularly relevant when stakes are low, time is scarce and priors are di¤use (cf
Simon, 1982).
In the following we select behavior according to a worst case analysis based on regret which
extends work of Berry and Fristedt (1985) who themselves build on Gibbons (1952) and Wald
(1950). We measure performance of a rule according to the largest regret it induces among all
priors and select for rules with smallest maximal regret. We show how this approach relates to
a Bayesian decision maker is endowed with the prior under which learning is most di¢cult.
Weusea distribution freeapproach whichmeans that wedo not invokepriors. Thissimpli…es
thetask ofthe individual as he does not have to calculatea new ruleeach timehefacesa similar
decision problem. Unfortunately there areonly few results on selecting rules for decision making
using a distribution free method such as Börgers et al. (2001).
The setting of this paper is as in the classic multi-armed bandit problem where a decision
maker repeatedly chooses (in consecutive rounds) one of a …nite number of actions. Each choice
yields a random payo¤ which is drawn according to an action dependent distribution which is
stationary and independent of previous occurrences. We assume that payo¤s belong to [0;1]
but our results generalize immediately to any given bounded interval [®; !] ½ R. The classic
multi-armed bandit speci…cation includes a prior over these payo¤ distributions.
A behavioral rule is a description of which action the individual chooses next given his
previous observations. The behavioral rule has n round memory if current behavior does not
1depend on choices or payo¤s obtained more than n rounds ago. A (randomized) rule is a
probability measure over deterministic behavioral rules. A multi-action decision problem is the
speci…cation of a payo¤ distribution for each action. A prior is a probability measure over the
set of multi-action decision problems.
We assume that the individual is risk neutral and that future payo¤s are discounted with a
given discount factor ± 2 (0;1): Again our results generalize immediately if instead we consider
von Neuman-Morgenstern utility that is contained in a bounded interval. A worst case prior
is a prior that maximizes over all priors the di¤erence between the expected discounted payo¤
obtained if the underlying distributions of each arm are known and the expected discounted
payo¤ achieved by the optimal rule. Here optimality refers to standard payo¤ maximization
while updating the prior over time. The regret of a given rule under a given prior is de…ned as
the di¤erence between the expected discounted payo¤ obtained if the underlying distributions
of each arm are known and the expected discounted payo¤ achieved by the given rule. Thus,
the worst case prior maximizes the regret of the optimal rule over all priors.
In this paper we are interested in selecting a rule without making assumptions on the prior
and choose to select according to minimax regret (Wald, 1950, Gibbons, 1952). The idea is to
learn when there are incentives to learn. We evaluate the performance of a given rule by the
maximal regret it yields over all priors and then select for the rule that yields the minimal value
of the maximal regret.
A behavioral rule is linear ifchoice probabilities are linearobserved payo¤s. Typically linear
ruleswill not emergefromBayesian learning aslinearrulestypically involverandomizingbetween
actions when all payo¤s observed belong to (0;1). On the other hand, we provide evidence that
Bayesian optimal rules typically do not involve randomizing.
Symmetric randomized rules are randomized rules whose behavior does not depend on the
labels of the actions. Under a symmetric rule each action is played equally likely in the …rst
round. Notice that randomized rules that are symmetric need not have only symmetric rules in
their support.
We extend results obtained by Berry and Fristedt (1985) for Bernoulli two-armed bandits
to our setting that includes also more than two actions and a continuum of payo¤s. (i) There
exists a randomized rule that only has linear symmetric rules in its support and that attains
2minimax regret. (ii) There exists a worst case prior that is a probability measure over Bernoulli
decision problems only. (iii) Any rule that attains minimax regret is optimal for a Bayesian
facing a worst case prior. The theorem also provides a method to characterize minimax regret
and worst case priors in terms of a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game where the player
minimizes regret and nature maximizes. Berry and Fristedt (1985) prove their result by …rst
establishing the existenceofa Nash equilibrium and then invoking standard minimax results for
zero-sum games. However, as they also point out, regret is no longer continuous when payo¤s
are allowed to be in [0; 1] instead of only in f0;1g and consequently existence of Nash equilibria
can no longer be easily established. We avoid this problem with a very simple trick and show
that it is enough to useminimax regret rules obtained for theBernoulli caseifone extends these
linearly to rules on [0; 1].
Given the above, minimax regret can be considered a way to select among the rules that are
Bayesian optimal under some prior. Unfortunately, a large part of the literature on Bayesian
decision-making assumes that the arms are independent which need not be true.
Intherest ofthepaperweconsidertwo armsonly. First weprovidesomeuseful techniquesfor
…nding minimax behavior. Assumethat there is a rulewith …nitememory that attainsminimax
regret with a symmetric worst case prior that has only two two-armed decision problems in its
support. Then we prove that the worst case prior equals Q0 where Q0 is the symmetric prior
that puts equal weight on the two deterministic two-action decisions in which one arm yields
payo¤ 1 and the other payo¤ 0. So we only have to check Q0 as a worst case prior if we are
interested in simple rules and simple priors. In the proof we use existing results by Kakigi
(1983) on Bayesian optimal rules under two-point distributions. Next we show that there exists
a critical value ±1 ¼0:61 such that Q0 is not a worst case prior if ± > ±1: This result applies for
any minimax regret behavior and is proven using Taylor expansions near Q0:
Next we investigate minimax regret behavior when ± is small. It is intuitive that Q0 is the
worst case prior when ± is su¢ciently small as it maximizes the minimum regret in the …rst
round. In fact, the following symmetric linear single round memory rule is Bayesian optimal
against Q0: This rulespeci…es to repeat the previous action with probability equal to the payo¤
attained. This rule has been proposed by Robbins (1952) as a very simple rule to use when
± =1 and payo¤ are in f0; 1g who also derived its maximal regret for this case (seealso Tsetlin,
31961). We …nd that this single round memory rule attains minimax regret with Q0 as worst
case prior if ± ·
p
2 ¡1 ¼ 0:41 but does not attain minimax regret for higher values of ±. Our
result for small ± stands in contrast to the fact that Bayesian optimal rules do not necessarily
have …nite memory when ± is small. It is simply that the worst case prior does not require more
memory.
Wealso investigatetwo round memory rules and …nd that thelinearization ofa rule proposed
by Robbins (1956) (again for ± = 1 and payo¤s in f0;1g) attains minimax regret if and only
± · ±1 where ±1 is the same value obtained above. Q0 is the worst case prior when ± · ±1 and
thus together with our previous results that we …nd that Q0 is a worst case prior if and only if
± · ±1: The selected two round memory rule has the stay with a winner property in the sense
that the same action is played again whenever the highest payo¤ is obtained. It chooses the
same arm again in the next two rounds whenever payo¤ 1 is obtained and otherwise switches
arms each time 0 is obtained.
Finally weinvestigate for which values of± between
p
2¡1 and ±1 memory ofthe payo¤ two
rounds ago is not necessary to achieve minimax regret. We …nd that there is a cuto¤ ±0 ¼ 0:54
such that this is only possible if ± < ±0: The selected symmetric linear rule has the stay with a
winner property, speci…es to switch arms after payo¤ 0 unless the same arm is chosen twice in
which case arms are switched with probability approximately equal to 0:16:
We proceed as follows. Section two introduces decision problems and strategies. Section
three contains the necessary de…nitions. In Section four we supply the main characterization
result of minimax regret behavior and worst case priors. In the …nal Section …ve we analyze
separately rules that attain minimax regret among those with single round memory, two round
memory and two round action memory.
2 Decision Problems and Rules
Let ¢Y denote the set of probability measures over the set Y: A multi-action decision problem
(W;P) consists ofa …nite set of actions W (with jWj ¸ 2) and a measurable payo¤ distribution
Pi 2 ¢R for each action i 2 W: Sometimes we will index parameters by the decision problem
D they refer to, e.g. write Pi(D) instead of Pi: In the following …x W and consider only
4payo¤ distributions belonging to ¢[0;1] :1 The set of all multi-action decision problems will be
denoted by D. A multi-armed bandit is described by a …nite set of actions W and by a prior (or
probability measure) Q 2 ¢D over the set of multi-action decision problems with action set W:
We add the term “Bernoulli” if realized payo¤s only belong to f0;1g where the payo¤s 0 and 1
are referred to as failure and success respectively.2 The set ofall Bernoulli multi-action decision
problems will be denoted by D0:
Let ¼i(D) =
R
xdPi(x; D) denote the expected payo¤ of choosing action i when facing the
multi-action decision problem D: Given D 2 D and a permutation ¶ of W let D¶ 2 D be the
multi-action decision problem de…ned by permuting the labels of the actions in D using ¶, i.e.
Pi(D¶) = P¶(i) (D) for i 2 W: For a given multi-armed bandit Q2 ¢D let Q¶ be thedistribution
de…ned by interchanging the labels of the actions in Q. A prior Q is called symmetric if Q= Q¶
holds for all permutations ¶ of W: The set of symmetric priors over a subset Z of D will be
denoted by ¢pZ: The symmetric prior Q will be called a symmetric two point prior if there
exist 0 · v < w ·1 such that Q(v;w)
³
~ D
´
= 1
2 for ~ D 2 D0 with ¼1
³
~ D
´
=v and ¼2
³
~ D
´
=w:
We also write Q0 instead of Q(0;1):
Consider an individual who repeatedly faces the same multi-armed bandit Q. In each of a
sequence of rounds the individual is asked to choose an action from W: Before the …rst round
nature selects the multi-armed decision problem
³
W; ~ P
´
the individual is facing according to
the prior Q: Choice of action i in round t yields a payo¤ realized according to ~ Pi that is drawn
independently of previous choices and payo¤ realizations of the individual.
A rule is the formal description of how this individual makes his choice as a function of his
previous experience. A behavioral rule is a mapping f : ; [1
m=1 £m
k=1fW £[0; 1]g ! W where
f (;)i is the probability of choosing action i in the …rst round and f (a1; x1; ::;am;xm)i is the
probability of choosing action i in round m+ 1 after choosing action ak and receiving payo¤
xk in round k for k = 1; ::;m. A deterministic rule is a behavioral rule in which the choice in
each round is always deterministic.. The set of all deterministic rules will be denoted by F: A
(randomized) rule Á is an element of ¢F:
1Our results can be applied to payo¤ distributions over a given bounded interval [®;!] by …rst rescaling payo¤s
using the linear transformation x 7¡ ! x¡®
!¡®:
2The machine learning literature (cf Naremdra and Thathachar, 1989) refers to this situation as the P-model.
In the Q-model and in the S-model the support of the payo¤ distribution is …nite and in…nite respectively.
5We say that the behavioral rule f has n round memory if the behavior of f in round m+1
does not depend on ak or xk fork · m¡n. f has …nite memory if thereexistsn such that f has
n round memory. f has n round action memory if f has n round memory where the behavior
of f in round m+1 does not depend on xk for k · m¡1:
Given a behavioral rulef and a permutation¶ ofW let ¶ (f) be the behavioral rulethat isde-
rived from f by permuting actions with ¶; i.e., ¶(f) (;)i =f (;)¶(i) and ¶(f)(a1; x1; ::;am;xm)i =
f (¶(a1); x1; ::;¶ (am);xm)¶(i) : Then f is called symmetric if ¶ (f) ´ f for all permutations ¶ of
W: The set of all symmetric rules are denoted by Fp: A randomized rule Á is called symmetric
if Á(T) = Á(f¶ (f) s.t. f 2 Tg) holds for all permutations ¶ of W and for all sets of deter-
ministic rules T: The set of symmetric randomized rules will be denoted by ¢pF: Notice that
¢Fp $¢pF:
A behavioral rule f is called linear if f (a1;x1; ::;am; xm)i is linear in xk for all k = 1;::; m
and all m which means that
f (a1; x1; ::;am;xm)i =
1 X
j1=0
::
1 X
jm=0
[¦m
k=1 (jkxk +(1¡jk) (1 ¡xk))]f (a1;j1;::; am;jm)i
holds for all m and for all ai 2 W and xi 2 [0;1], i =1; ::;m: The set of all linear deterministic
rules will be denoted by FL:
Thebehavioral rulef will beattributedthe‘stay withawinner’ property iff (a1;x1;::; am;1)am =
1 for all ak; xk; k =1;::; m¡1; all am and all m:
3 Selection
Assumefromnow onthat theindividual isrisk neutral and discountsfuturepayo¤swith discount
factor ± 2 (0; 1):3 For a given rule Á and a given decision problem D let p
(n)
i = p
(n)
i (Á;D) be
the probability of choosing action i 2 W in round n unconditional on previous choices. Then
¼± (Á;D) := (1 ¡±)
P1
n=1
P
i2W p
(n)
i (Á;D) ¼i(D) is the discounted value of future payo¤s.
The regret (or opportunity loss) of a rule Á when facing the multi-action decision problem
D is de…ned as LÁ(D) := maxi2W f¼i(D)g ¡¼± (Á; D): Regret is a measure of the loss due to
ignorance of the true state of a¤airs.
3Our analysis also applies to agents that are not risk neutral by replacing payo¤s with von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities as long as utility is bounded.
6If the individual faces a known multi-armed bandit ~ Q then he chooses a rule Á¤ 2 argmax
R
¼±
Á(D)d~ Q(D): Wecall Á¤ with thisproperty Bayesian optimal under ~ Q. Wewill call ¹ Qa worst
case prior ifit maximizestheexpectedregret ofthisindividual, i.e. if ¹ Q2 maxQ2¢D
R
LÁ¤(Q)(D)dQ(D)
where Á¤ (Q) is a Bayesian optimal rule under Q: Simplifying we obtain that ¹ Q is a worst case
prior if and only if ¹ Q 2 maxQ2¢D minÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) :
If W is known but the prior ~ Q is unknown then according to Savage (1972) the individ-
ual speci…es a subjective prior ^ Q and chooses a Bayesian optimal rule under ^ Q: An alternative
approach is to assume that the individual selects a rulethat minimizesamong all rules the max-
imum among all decision problems (with action set W) the expected regret. More speci…cally,
we say that Á attains minimax regret if Á¤ 2 argminÁ2¢F supD2D LÁ(D):
4 General Results
We present our central theorem on the characterization of minimax regret behavior and worst
case priors.
Proposition 1 i) There exists a worst case prior in ¢pD0 and a rule in ¢FL
p that attains
minimax regret. The value of minimax regret is strictly positive.
ii) Á¤ 2 ¢FL
p attains minimax regret and Q¤ 2 ¢pD0 is a worst case prior if and only if
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) ·
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ¤ (D) ·
Z
LÁ(D)dQ¤ (D) 8Á 2 ¢FL
p 8Q 2 ¢pD0:
(iii) Á¤ 2 ¢F attains minimax regret and Q¤ 2 ¢D is a worst case prior if and only if
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) ·
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ¤ (D) ·
Z
LÁ(D)dQ¤ (D) 8Á 2 ¢F 8Q 2 ¢D: (1)
In particular, thismeansthat any rulethat attains minimax regret isBayesian optimal under
any worst case prior. The above generalizes …ndings that Berry and Fristedt (1985) obtained
already for Bernoulli two-armed bandits. Theonly additional insight for this special case is that
we prove the existence of a randomized symmetric rule that attains minimax regret instead of
simply existence of a symmetric randomized rule that possibly includes non symmetric rules in
its support.
7Proof. We …rst review the results of Berry and Fristedt (1985) obtained for Bernoulli two-
armed bandits which are statement (i) and the ‘if’ statements of (ii) and (iii) while replacing
¢FL
p by ¢pFL. They introduce a topology on the set of strategies and then show that a Nash
equilibrium (Á¤;Q¤) exists in thezero sum gamewherethe individual chooses a ruleto minimize
regret and nature chooses a prior to maximize regret. If (Á¤;Q¤) is a such a Nash equilibrium
(i.e. (1) holds when restricted to the case of jWj =2 and Q2 ¢D0) then
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ¤ (D) = max
Q2¢D0
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) ¸ min
Á2¢F
max
Q2¢D0
Z
LÁ(D)dQ(D)
¸ max
Q2¢D0
min
Á
Z
LÁ(D) dQ(D) ¸ min
Á2¢F
Z
LÁ(D)dQ
¤ (D) =
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ
¤ (D)
whichproves the‘if’ statement of(iii) forBernoulli two-armed bandits. Berry andFristedt (1985)
also ensure theexistenceof a strictly positive lower bound on thevalueof minimax regret so this
completes (i) for Bernoulli two-armed bandits. Quasi-concavity of maxQ2¢D0
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D)
as a function of Á shows that ¢pF \ argminÁ2¢F maxQ2¢D0
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) 6= ;: Similarly,
quasi-convexity of minÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) as a function of Q is used to show that ¢pD0 \
argmaxQ2¢D0 minÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) 6= ;: Finally, the ‘if’ statement of (ii) follows from
the fact that ¢pD0 \ argmaxQ2¢D0
R
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) 6= ; if Á¤ 2 ¢pF and similarly, ¢pF \
argminÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ¤ (D) 6=; if Q¤ 2 ¢pD0:
Theabovecan be generalized to Bernoulli multi-armed banditsimmediately. In thefollowing
we will show that it also holds when payo¤s are not restricted to f0; 1g: Let (Á¤; Q¤) 2 ¢FL £
¢D0 be a Nash equilibrium (that exists) of thezero-sum game when restricting attention to D0:
SinceÁrandomizesover linear rules, maxQ2¢D0
R
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) = maxQ2¢D
R
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D)
and Q¤ 2 ¢D0 impliesthat minÁ2¢FL
R
LÁ(D) dQ¤(D) =minÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ¤(D)andhence
(1) holds. Notice furthermore that the “if statement” of (iii) holds as stated by the same proof
as when we considered only D0. Part (i) and the “if statement” of (ii) then also follow as above.
Consider now the ‘only if’ statements of (ii) and (iii). If Á¤ attains minimax regret and Q¤
is a worst case prior then
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ¤ (D) · sup
Q2¢D
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) = min
Á2¢F
sup
Q2¢D
Z
LÁ(D)dQ(D)
max
Q2¢D
inf
Á2¢F
Z
LÁ(D)dQ(D) = inf
Á2¢F
Z
LÁ(D)dQ¤ (D) ·
Z
LÁ¤ (D)dQ¤(D)
8so the claim follows as we know that minÁ2¢F supQ2¢D0
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) =maxQ2¢D0 infÁ2¢F
R
LÁ(D)dQ(D) holds.
Finally weneed to showthat ¢pFL canbereplacedby ¢FL
p inthestatementsabove. Assume
that Á¤ 2 ¢pFL attains minimax regret. Let Á+ 2 ¢FL
p be such that Á+(a;::) ´ Á¤ (a; ::):
Then
R
LÁ¤ (D)dQ(D) =
R
LÁ+ (D)dQ(D) holdsfor all Q 2 ¢pD0 which proves the statement.
The above undermines the usefulness of linearity for attaining minimax regret. Notice that
linear rules typically involve randomizing after round one, for instance whenever only interior
payo¤s in (0; 1) are obtained in all previous rounds then behavior is either random or all payo¤s
are “ignored”. More speci…cally, if f is a linear rule and xk 2 (0;1) for all n then either
f (a1;x1;::; an; xn)c is independent of x1;::; xn or f (a1;x1; ::;an; xn;::; am;xm) = 2 W: In contrast
we now show that Bayesian optimal rules typically do not involve randomizing.
Proposition 2 For almost all symmetric priors there is some payo¤ z 2 (0; 1) that can occur
in any round where no Bayesian optimal rule will randomize after receiving z:
Proof. Consider a symmetric prior Q 2 ¢pD such that there exists a payo¤ z 2 (0; 1)
that can occur for any D drawn under Q and that reveals that the current arm is best, i.e.
P (¼c (D) >¼d (D)j arm c yields z, D unknown but drawn using prior Q) = 1; c 6= d: Notice
that the set of such priors lies dense in ¢pD. Consider any f 2 argminf2F
R
Lf (D)dQ(D)
and any history (a1; x1; ::;am¡1;xm¡1) that can arise under f for someD drawn under Q: Then
f (a1;x1;::; am; z)am =1:
4.0.1 Necessary Conditions in Two-Armed Bandits
Given Proposition 1 minimax regret can be considered a method to select among rules that are
Bayesian optimal under some prior. Unfortunately we cannot utilize the bulk of the two-armed
bandit that concerns only independent arms as we do not expect that worst case prior have this
property. Westart by investigating when a …nite memory rule can attain minimax regret under
a symmetric prior with a two point distribution.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of two-armed bandits. If the linear symmetric n round mem-
ory rule Á¤ attains minimax regret and argmaxD2D0:¼a(D)>¼b(D)LÁ¤ (D) is single valued then
9Q0 is a worst case prior.
Proof. Let fD0g = argmaxD2D0:¼a(D)>¼b(D)LÁ¤ (D): Since Á¤ is assumed to attain minimax
regret, ¼b (D0) < ¼a (D0). Hence, the symmetric two point prior Q(¼b (D0); ¼a (D0)) is a worst
case prior.
We now analyze optimal behavior under a symmetric two point prior Q(v; w).
Kakigi (1983) shows that the following symmetric rule is optimal in such a symmetric two
point prior. Chooseaction c in round n if thebeliefs based on experience up to round n indicate
that the probability that ¼c >¼d is greater than 0:5 where fc; dg =fa;bg:
Samaranayake (1992) shows that the two arms are negatively correlated after any history.
As the support of each marginal distribution has two elements we can apply Proposition 5.2 in
(Samaranayake, 1992) to show that the individual strictly prefers action c over d after c yielded
a success and strictly prefers action d over c after c yielded a failure. This means that the rule
of Kakigi (1983) is the unique optimal behavior whenever the updated prior does not equal 0:5:
It is clear that the optimal behavior doesnot have…niteround memory when 0 <v <w <1.
Assume v = 0 and w 2 (0;1): Then a Bayesian optimal behavior is given by the symmetric
two round memory rule f¤ that has the staying with a winner property and where f¤ (c;0)c =
f¤(c; 0; d; 0)d = 0 and f¤ (c;¤; c; 0)c = 1 for c 6= d: Let z be the future value after only failure
obtained previously then z = (1 ¡±) 1
2w + 1
2w±w +
¡
1 ¡ 1
2w
¢
±z so z = w 1¡±+w±
2¡2±+w± and hence
Lf¤ = w ¡z =
(1¡±)w
2¡2±+w± which for given ± obtains its unique maximum when w = 1: Thus,
Q(0;w) is never a worst case prior if w <1:
Finally, assumev > 0 and w = 1: HereaBayesian optimal behaviorisgivenby thesymmetric
singleroundmemory rulef¤ that hasthestayingwithawinnerpropertyandwheref¤ (c; 0)c =0:
Let x be the future value of payo¤s after only achieving successes in the previous rounds with
the worse arm. Then x = (1¡±)v +v±x +(1¡v)± so x = ±+v¡2±v
1¡±v and hence Lf¤ = 1 ¡
1
2 ¡ 1
2
±+v¡2±v
1¡±v = 1
2
(1¡±)(1¡v)
1¡±v which for given ± obtains its unique maximum when v = 0: Thus,
Q(v; 1) is never a worst case prior if v >0:
Proposition 4 Consider two-armed bandits. Then Q0 is not a worst case prior for ± > ¡1
2 +
1
2
p
5.
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Then d
d¼aL(1;0) ¸ 0 ¸ d
d¼bL (1; 0): In the following we will consider only regret in the two two-
armed Bernoulli decisionswith (¼a;¼b) 2 f(1;v); (w;0)g for v; w 2 (0; 1): Sincef¤ is symmetric,
f¤(;) = 1
2: Since Q0 is a worst case prior we have f¤ (c;x)c =x for c 2 fa; bg and x 2 f0; 1g:
When facing (¼a; ¼b) = (1; v) then we will ignore events when arm b yields two successes.
Similarly, when facing (¼a;¼b) = (w; 0) then wewill ignoreeventswhen arm ayields two failures.
Given these restrictions we can assume that f¤ plays a best response whenever possible against
these two particular decision problems. So once we observe two successes of the same arm then
we are choosing the better arm and lock in on that action. In particular this means that when
facing (¼a;¼b) =(1; v), if wechoosethebetter action in the …rst round then this action is chosen
forever. Similarly, we know that arm a is the better arm after observing (b; 0) and (a;1).
Let x = f¤ (c;1;c; 0)d and y = f¤ (d; 0;c;0)d for c 6= d: Consider payo¤s when facing
(¼a; ¼b) =(w; 0): Then
¼± = (1¡±)
1
2
w +(1 ¡±) ±
1
2
(1 +w)w +
1
2
w±2w +
1
2
w2±2w
+(1 ¡±)±2
µ
1
2
w (1 ¡w)x+
1
2
(1¡w)y +
1
2
(1¡w)(1 ¡y)
¶
w
+±3
µ
1
2
(1 ¡x)w2 (1¡w)w +
1
2
w(1¡w)xw
¶
+
1
2
(1¡w)±3w((1¡y) +yw +(1¡y)w +y)+O
³
(1 ¡w)
2´
where the expressions refer to the payo¤s in round one and two, continuation payo¤ start-
ing round three after the events (b;0;a;1) and (a; 1;a; 1); round three payo¤s after (a;1;a;0);
(a; 0; b;0)and(b;0;a;0)andcontinuation payo¤sstartinground fourafter(a; 1; a; 0;a; 1); (a;1; a; 0; b;0)
and after (a; 0; b;0;b; 0); (a;0;b; 0; a; 1); (b;0; a;0; a; 1) and (b; 0;a; 0;b;0): Here we assume that
f¤(a;0;b; 0;b;0)b = f¤ (b;0; a; 0; b;0)b = 0 following the Bayesian optimal behavior against
Q(0;w): Consequently,
Lf¤ =
1
2
(1¡±) ¡
1
2
(1¡±)
¡
1¡±¡±2 ¡x±2¢
(1¡w) +O
³
(1 ¡w)
2
´
and hence 1¡±¡±2¡x±2 ¸ 0 isnecessary for Q0 to bea worst caseprior. However, 1¡±¡±2 <0
for ± > ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5 so for values of ± with this property there is no value of x under which Q0 is
a worst case prior.
11We combine the above to obtain the following.
Corollary 5 Consider two armed bandits and assume ± > ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5: Then either there is no n
roundmemory rule thatattains minimax regretor the worst case prior argmaxD2D0:¼a(D)>¼b(D) LÁ¤ (D)
is not single valued for any Á¤ that attains minimax regret.
Next we derive behavior in the …rst three rounds for a symmetric rule that attains minimax
regret at the critical discount factor.
Proposition 6 Assume that f¤ is a symmetric rule that attains minimax regret when ± =
¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5: Then f¤(c; 0)c = 0; f¤ (c;1; c;0)c = 1; f¤(c; 0; d; 1)d = 1; f¤(c; 1; c;1;c; 0)c = 1;
f¤(c; 1; c;0;c; 0)c = 0; f¤ (c; 0; d; 1;d;0)d = 1; f¤ (c;0;d;0;c; 0)c = 0 if f¤ (c;0;d;0)c > 0;
f¤(c; 0; d; 0;d;0)d = 0 if f¤ (c; 0;d;0)d > 0 and f¤ does not switch after any success in the
…rst three rounds. In particular, f¤ does not have n round action memory for any n.
In particular, rules suggested by Robbins (1956) or Isbell (1959) for n > 2 do not attain
minimax regret when ± = ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5.
Proof. First we providethe analogous calculations as in the proof of Proposition 4 when facing
(¼a; ¼b) =(1;v): We calculate¼± wherewedo not explicitly calculateevents where two successes
of the worse arm occur. Then
¼± =
1
2
+
1
2
(1¡±)v +
1
2
(1¡v)± +
1
2
v (1 ¡v)x±2 +
1
2
v (1¡v)(1¡x)(1 ¡v)±3 +O
¡
v2¢
wheretheexpressionsrefer to theevent (a;1;a;1; :::), thepayo¤in round onefrom choosing arm
b and the events (b; 0;a; 1;a;1;:::); (b; 1; b;0;a;1; a;1; :::) and (b; 1;b;0; b;0;a;1;a;1; :::). Conse-
quently
Lf¤ =
1
2
(1 ¡±)¡
1
2
(1 ¡±)
¡
1 ¡± ¡(1¡x)±2¢
v +O
¡
v2¢
and hence 1¡±¡±2 +x±2 ¸ 0 is necessary if Q0 is a worst case prior.
Looking a bit more carefully at the above calculations as well as those in the proof of
Proposition 4 it is easily veri…ed that Q0 is not a worst case prior if one of the conditions in the
statement of the proposition do not hold.
125 Rules attaining minimax regret in two-armed bandits
In the following we will consider two arms only and search for rules that attain minimax regret
when ± is small. Let W = fa;bg. Given our above result we search for Nash equilibria of the
zero-sum game. If Á is symmetric then each action is played with probability 0:5 in the …rst
round and we obtain LÁ(D) = (1¡±)0:5j¼a ¡¼bj +(1¡±)o(±): This gives us intuition that
the decision problem that maximizes regret satis…es f¼a;¼bg = f0; 1g. We do not try to prove
this directly but use this intuition to motivate our search for situations where the worst case
prior puts equal weight on the two two-armed decision problems in which one arm yields payo¤
1 and the other arm yields payo¤ 0: Let Q0 denote this prior. Bayesian optimal rules with …nite
memory for facing Q0 are easily computed. All we then check is whether Q0 maximizes regret
of such a Bayesian optimal rule.
5.1 Single round memory
Proposition 7 The linear symmetric single round memory rule that has the stay witha winner
property and that satis…es f (a;0)a = 0 attains minimax regret if and only if ± ·
p
2 ¡1. This
rule yields
¼± =
1
2
(¼a +¼b) +
1
2
±
1
1+±(1 ¡¼a ¡¼b)
(¼a ¡¼b)2 .
No other single round memory rule attains minimax regret when ± =
p
2¡1 ¼0:41:
Noticethat Bayesian optimal rulesgenerally do not have…nitememory even when ± issmall.
For instance, as argued in the proof of Proposition 3, any Bayesian optimal rule under the two
point distribution Q(v; w) with 0 <v <w <1 does not have …nite round memory.
Proof. Let Dc be the two-action decision problem with Pc (1) =Pd (0) =1 for d 2 Wnfcg and
let Q0 be the prior such that Q0(Dc) = 0:5 for c 2 W: Then it follows immediately that the
single round memory rule described above is the unique symmetric linear Bayesian optimal rule
under Q0:
In the following we show how to derive the above expression for ¼±: Let zc be the dis-
counted future value of payo¤s conditional on choosing action c: Then za =(1 ¡±)¼a +±¼aza+
(1¡¼a)±zb. Similar expression for zb and solving yields the above.
13Finally, given ¼a > ¼b we obtain
d
d¼a
L =
1
2
1+2±¡4±¼a +±2 ¡4±2¼a +2±2¼2
a +4±2¼a¼b ¡2±2¼2
b
(1 +±¡±¼a ¡±¼b)
2
where the enumerator is decreasing in ¼a: If ¼a = 1 then the enumerator is also increasing in
¼b. So evaluating the enumerator at ¼a = 1 and ¼b = 0 we obtain 1 ¡2± ¡±2 which has the
positive root ¡1 +
p
2. Hence d
d¼aL ¸ 0 holds for all ¼a and ¼b if ± · ¡1 +
p
2: On the other
hand, if ± >¡1 +
p
2 then d
d¼aL <0 when ¼a =1 and ¼b =0.
Similarly for ¼a > ¼b we obtain
d
d¼b
L = ¡
1
2
(1 +±¡2±¼a)
2
(1+±¡±¼a ¡±¼b)
2
which shows that Q0 is a worst case prior as long as ± · ¡1+
p
2:
Finally, it can beveri…edfortheselected rule, denotethisby Á¤; that argmaxD2D0:¼a(D)>¼b(D)LÁ¤ (D)
is single valued for all ± 2 (0; 1): Thus, by Corollary 5 Á¤ does not attain minimax regret for
± > ¡1 +
p
2: As Á¤ is the unique symmetric linear single round memory rule that is Bayesian
optimal against Q0 the statement is proven.
5.2 Two round memory
We …nd that the linearization of the rule suggested by Robbins (1956) for use in Bernoulli two-
armed decisions when ± = 1 attains minimax regret when ± is not too large. When payo¤s are
in f0;1g this rule prescribes to switch back and forth until the …rst success is obtained and then
to only switch after two consecutive failures.
Proposition 8 Consider the linear symmetric two round memory rule that has the stay with a
winner property and that satis…es f (¤;0;c; 0)c = 0 and f (c;1; c; 0)c =1 which yields
¼±;1 =
1
2
(¼1 +¼2) +
1
2
±
(¼1 ¡¼2)
2 (1+±¡±(¼1 +¼2))
±2 (1¡¼1)
2 +±2 (1 ¡¼2)
2 +(1¡±)(1+±(2¡¼1 ¡¼2))
.
This rule attains minimax regret if and only if ± · ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5. No other two round memory rule
attains minimax regret when ± =¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5 ¼ 0:62:
The rule selected above behaves in Bernoulli two-armed decisions like the one suggested by
Robbins (1956) for use when ± =1 with the only alteration that the decision maker randomizes
in the …rst round.
14Proof. Consider a two round memory rule with the stay with a winner property that is
Bayesian optimal against Q0: Then f (;)a = 0:5; f (c; 0)c = 0 and f (c;1)c = f (¤;¤;c; 1)c = 1:
Let z = f (c;0;c; 0)d ; x=f (c; 1; c;0)d and y =f (d; 0;c;0)d for c 6=d.
Starting round two the rule has six states a0a; a1a; a0b; b0b; b1b and b0a where cxd denotes
thestatein which thepresent action isd and the previous action was c which yielded x2 f0; 1g:
Then the probability of being in these states in round 2 equals 0; 1
2¼a; 1
2 (1¡¼a); 0; 1
2¼b and
1
2 (1¡¼b) respectively. Given the transition matrix M equal to
(1 ¡¼a)(1¡z) (1¡¼a)(1¡x) 0 0 0 (1 ¡¼a)(1¡y)
¼a ¼a 0 0 0 ¼a
(1 ¡¼a)z (1¡¼a)x 0 0 0 (1¡¼a)y
0 0 (1¡¼b)(1¡y) (1 ¡¼b)(1 ¡z) (1 ¡¼b)(1 ¡x) 0
0 0 ¼b ¼b ¼b 0
0 0 (1 ¡¼b)y (1 ¡¼b)z (1¡¼b)x 0
we obtain for ¼a > ¼b that
L(¼a; ¼b) =¼a ¡
1
2
(1¡±)(¼a +¼b) ¡(1 ¡±)±
³
¼a ¼a ¼b ¼b ¼b ¼a
´
(Id¡±M)¡1 »
where » is the vector of probabilities in round two.
It can be veri…ed that
d
d¼a
L (1; 0) =
1
2
1¡(3¡z)±+(¡x+2¡2z)±2 +
¡
¡zy ¡x¡xz +xy+y2 +z
¢
±3 +(z ¡y)(y¡x)±4
1 ¡±+±z
d
d¼b
L (1; 0) = ¡
1
2
(1¡±)
¡
1¡2±+±z+(x¡z)±2¢
1 ¡±+±z
We search for maximal ± such that d
d¼aL(1; 0) ¸0 ¸ d
d¼b L(1;0): From the second inequality
we obtain x ¸ z ¡ (1 ¡2±+±z)=±2: Since d
d¼aL(1;0) is decreasing in x we replace x by z ¡
(1¡2±+±z)=±2 in the enumerator of d
d¼aL (1;0) to obtain that
¡
2¡4±+
¡
¡2±3 ¡3±2 +3±
¢
z +
¡
¡±4 +±2¢
z2¢
+±
¡
2±3z ¡±2z +2±2 +±¡±z¡1
¢
y+±3 (1¡±)y2 ¸0
It is easily veri…ed that the left had side of the above inequality is convex in z and y and hence
there are four cases z; y 2 f0; 1g to check. It is then directly veri…ed that the inequality is
violated for ± < 0:6 when z =0 while it holds for ± · ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5 when z = 1 and either y =0
or y =1:
15Consider the rule with y = 1; z = 1 and x= 0: This yields
L =
1
2
(¼a ¡¼b)
¡
1 +± ¡2±¼a ¡2±2¼a +2±2¼2
a
¢
1 +±¡±¼a ¡±¼b ¡±2¼a ¡±2¼b +±2¼2
a +±2¼2
b
:
Assume ± · ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5: By …rst showing that d
d¼b L ·0 and then that d
d¼aL ¸ 0 holds when
¼b = 0 it can easily be veri…ed that (¼a; ¼b) = (1; 0) is the unique maximizer of L conditional
on ¼a >¼b.
The alternative rule with y = 0; z =1 and x= 0 we obtain for ¼2 =0
L =
1
2
¼1
±+±3 +1+2±2¼2
1 ¡2±¼1 ¡3±2¼1 ¡3±3¼1 +±2 +2±3¼2
1
1+±¡2±2¼1 ¡2±3¼1 +±2¼2
1 ¡±¼1 +±3¼2
1 +±3 +±2
and d2
(d¼1)2L =±(2±¡1)(1 +±)2 if ¼1 =1 so this rule does not attain minimax regret if ± > 1
2:
Finally, it can beveri…edfortheselected rule, denotethisby Á¤; that argmaxD2D0:¼a(D)>¼b(D)LÁ¤ (D)
is single valued for all ± 2 (0; 1): Thus, by Corollary 5 Á¤ does not attain minimax regret for
± >¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5:
Combining the above result with Proposition 4 we obtain:
Corollary 9 Q0 is a worst case prior if and only if ± ·¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5:
5.3 Two round action memory
Proposition 10 There exists ±0 with ±0 ¼0:544 such that:
(i) If ± ·±0 then the linear symmetric two round action memory rule that has the stay with
a winner property and that satis…es f (c; ¢;c; 0)c = 1¡±0
±0 ¼ 0:84 and f (c;¢;d; 0)d = 0 for c 6= d
attains minimax regret.
(ii) If ±0 < ± · ¡1
2 + 1
2
p
5 then there is no two round action memory rule that attains
minimax regret.
Proof. Consider a two round action memory rule with the stay with a winner property that is
Bayesian optimal against Q0: Then f (;)a = 0:5; f (c;0)c = 0 and f (c;1)c = f (d;x;c;1)c = 1:
Let ¸ =f (c;¤;c; 0)d and ¹ = f (c;¤; d; 0)c for c 6=d.
Starting round two therule has four states aa; ab; bb; ba where cd denotes the state in which
the present action is d and the previous action was c: Let vn; wn; yn and zn be the probabilities
16of being in these states in rounds n ¸ 2: Then v2 = 1
2¼a; w2 = 1
2 (1 ¡¼a); y2 = 1
2¼b and
z2 = 1
2 (1 ¡¼b): Given the transition matrix M equal to
¼a +(1¡¼a)(1¡¸) 0 0 ¼a +(1 ¡¼a)(1 ¡¹)
(1 ¡¼a)¸ 0 0 (1¡¼a)¹
0 ¼b +(1 ¡¼b)(1 ¡¹) ¼b +(1¡¼b)(1¡¸) 0
0 (1 ¡¼b)¹ (1¡¼b)¸ 0
we obtain
³
vn+1 wn+1 yn+1 zn+1
´T
=M
³
vn wn yn zn
´T
and hence
L = maxf¼a; ¼bg
¡
1
2
(1¡±)(¼a +¼b) ¡(1 ¡±)±
³
¼a ¼b ¼b ¼a
´
(Id¡±M)
¡1
³
v2 w2 y2 z2
´T
where Id2 R4;4 is the identity matrix.
The explicit expression for L is too elaborate to present here but it is easily veri…ed for
¼a >¼b that
d
d¼a
Lj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) =
1
2
¡
1 ¡3± +±¸+2±2 ¡3±2¸¡±3¸2 ¡±4¸2¢
+2±4¸¹ +
¡
±3 ¡±4¢
¹2
1¡±+±¸
d
d¼b
Lj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) = ¡1
2
(1 ¡±)(1 ¡2±+±¸)
1¡±+±¸
In the following we search values of ¸ and ¹ that maximize the largest value of ± such that
d
d¼aLj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) ¸ 0 and d
d¼bLj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) ·0 holds. Let ¸0; ¹0 and ±0 be the solutions to this
problem. It follows that ¹0 = 1 which yields d
d¼aLj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) = 1
2
¡
¡±3¸+±3 ¡±2¸¡2±+1
¢
:
So weare looking for ¸0 and ±0 such that 1¡2±0+±0¸0 =0 and ¡±3
0¸+±3
0 ¡±2
0¸0¡2±0+1 =0:
Solving these two equations yields ¸0 = 2±0¡1
±0 and
±0 =
3
sµ
17
27
+
1
9
p
33
¶
¡
2
9
3
q¡17
27 + 1
9
p
33
¢ ¡
1
3
¼ 0:54369:
Thus, for ± > ±0 either d
d¼aLj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) < 0 or d
d¼b Lj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) > 0 which means for ± > ±0
that either Q0 is not a worst caseprior. Combining this with Proposition 8 wehaveproven part
(ii).
In the following weconsider ± ·±0; ¸=¸0; ¹ = 1 and ¼a >¼b and will prove that L attains
its maximum at (¼a; ¼b) =(1;0):
17First we will prove that d
d¼b L · 0. Let ¼a = 1¡w: Then
L =
1
2
(1¡w ¡¼b) +(1¡w ¡¼b)(¸0w +w ¡2 +¼b +¸0 ¡¼b¸0)±
+(¸0 ¡1)(¡1+w +¼b)(¡¸0w +¼b¸0w ¡2w +¼bw +1 ¡¼b)±2
+w(¸0 ¡1)
2 (¡1 +¼b) (¡1 +w +¼b)±3
1 ¡(1+¼b¸0 ¡¸0 ¡¸0w)±¡w(¸0 ¡1) (¸0 +1)(¡1 +¼b) ±2 ¡w(¸0 ¡1)
2 (¡1+¼b)±3
Now also assume ¼b = 0: Then
d
d¼b
L = ¡
1
2
¡
1 ¡(1¡w ¡¸0w)±¡w(1¡¸0)±2¢
¤
³
1 ¡(2¡¸0)±+±
³
1+¸0 (1¡±)+¸2
0±+(1 ¡¸0)2±2
´
w ¡(1 ¡¸0)±2w2
´
¡
1+¸0w±¡w(1¡¸0)±2¢³
1¡(1¡¸0 ¡¸0w)±¡w
¡
1¡¸2
0
¢
±2 +w(1 ¡¸0)
2 ±3
´
The second factor in the enumerator is the only one that can take negative values. Looking at
this term we …nd that d
d¼b Lj(¼a;¼b)=(1;0) · 0 implies d
d¼b Lj¼b=0 ·0 for all ¼b: We also obtain
d
d¼b
d
d¼b
L =¡±
(1+±¸0 ¡±)
¡
±¸0w +±2¸0w ¡±+1 ¡w±2 +±w
¢2
(±¸0w +1 ¡±w)
2
¡
1 ¡(1+¼b¸0 ¡¸0 ¡¸0w)±¡w(1¡¸0) (1 ¡¼b)±2(1 +¸0 ¡(1 ¡¸0)±)
¢3 · 0
which completes the proof that d
d¼bL ·0 holds for ± ·±0:
If ¼b = 0 then
d
dw
L =¡1
2
¡
1¡2± ¡±2¸0 ¡±3¸0 +±3¢
+2±(1+¸0 +±¸0 ¡±)w
+±2 (1+¸0 +±¸0 ¡±)(¸0 +±¸0 ¡±)w2
¡
w±2¸0 +±¸0w ¡w±2 +1
¢2
Since (1+¸0 +±¸0 ¡±) ¸ 0 we obtain d
dwLj(w;¼b)=(0;0) · 0 implies d
dwLj¼b=0 · 0 which
completes the proof of the fact that (¼a; ¼b) =(1;0) maximizes L.
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